Secondary and postsecondary education systems in the United States historically have operated under highly disconnected policy and reform mechanisms (Boswell 2000; Kirst 2005; Krueger 2006) . 1 In the past decade, however, concerns over decreasing college completion rates, rising criticism of the lack of academic rigor in the senior year of high school, and growing demand for remedial postsecondary courses have led states to consider new ways to facilitate the transition between K-12 and the higher education systems (Karp et al. 2004; Pennington 2003) . One popular policy effort to unite the two systems is dual enrollment, which provides high school students with the opportunity to enroll in college-level courses for both high school and college credit.
Proponents of dual enrollment policies assert that the programs yield a number of benefits for students, families, postsecondary institutions, and policy makers (Karp et al. 2004 ; Western Interstate Commission for Higher Edu- Electronically published December 8, 2008 the programs-a 35 percent increase over the previous period. Today, 10 states have yet to pursue the policy strategy of dual enrollment.
Given these uneven patterns, what factors explain the rise of dual enrollment policies in American states? Why have some states chosen to pursue dual enrollment programs as a strategy for improving educational attainment and performance, while other states have ignored this particular approach? In what ways specifically do the political, economic, and social characteristics of states, as well as the competitive and emulative pressures that exist among states, shape policy choice in this important arena? How well does extant theory and research on the determinants of state policy adoption help to explain the phenomenon of dual enrollment policy adoption in American education?
Our article pursues these questions in an effort to shed empirical light on the rise and spread of dual enrollment policies in the states. We begin first by developing a conceptual framework and distilling a series of hypotheses that guided our empirical undertaking. We then describe the construction of a longitudinal data set containing indicators of the factors that we believe may have shaped state involvement toward dual enrollment policies. Next, we describe our research methods, which relied on use of event history analysis. After presenting our analytic results, we discuss the conceptual and analytical implications of our work.
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
Our investigation into the rise and spread of dual enrollment policies builds on three related bodies of scholarship: (1) the policy innovation and diffusion literature, (2) select studies in the area of state politics of education, and (3) growing research on determinants of state higher education policy. At the broadest level, our investigation links with the policy innovation and diffusion literature in that it focuses on the factors associated with distinctively new programs in the states. Walker's (1969) pioneering work of the late 1960s deeply influenced subsequent scholarship in several crucial respects. First, by examining the forces that give rise to new policies within states, Walker helped shift the focus away from the approach made popular by Dye (1966) and others, which had concentrated almost exclusively on interstate variation in governmental spending. 3 Second, Walker sought to account empirically for the influence of states' policy choices upon one another-that is, how states influence their neighbors or peers. Observing that some states had long been regarded as policy leaders (and others as policy laggards), Walker reasoned that states might borrow one another's policies both as a shortcut to decision making and as a means to achieve a competitive advantage relative to their peers. His factor-analytic study of the adoption patterns of nearly 100 different policies found that geographically proximate states tended to adopt similar policies in a similar order over time, a phenomenon he labeled "policy diffusion." While certain factors internal to states (e.g., legislative professionalism, economic conditions, etc.) seemed to influence the nature of the policies that states adopted, a state's neighbors also appeared to exert a policy influence independent of other forces. Following Walker, many studies of state policy adoption began examining the factors both internal to individual states (so-called internal determinants) and the ability of states to influence one another (diffusion pressures).
In the early 1990s, Berry and Berry (1990, 1992 ) conducted a series of important studies that helped refocus analytically on this line of inquiry. Previous diffusion studies had shared a methodological weakness: relying analytically on separate tests of the intrastate and interstate explanations, which failed to account for the causal factors specified in each of the rival models (Berry 1994) . Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) addressed this weakness via event history analysis (EHA)-a powerful methodological technique borrowed from biostatistics that permitted the analysts to combine both sets of explanations into a unified approach to studying state policy adoption. In these studies, Berry and Berry applied EHA in predicting the probability that a state would adopt a lottery or a new tax in a given year. Using this stronger analytic approach, these studies yielded similar results: both internal determinants and regional influences were significant predictors of state policy adoption. The findings sparked renewed interest in understanding the conditions that lead states to adopt new policies. In the years since, social scientists interested in governmental behavior have applied EHA to an impressively wide array of policies, including legislation regulating abortion, health insurance reforms, capital punishment legislation, hate-crime laws, same-sex marriage bans, and antismoking mandates (e.g., Haider-Markel 2001; Mooney and Lee 1995, 1999; Shipan and Volden 2006; Soule and Earl 2001; Volden 2006) .
Over the past decade, scholars of K-12 and higher education politics have arrived on the scene, building on the larger political science literature in seeking to better understand the forces that drive policy adoption within their respective domains. On the K-12 education side, most of this research has examined factors shaping state education reforms, principally the adoption of charter school and school choice legislation (Cohen-Vogel and Ingle 2007; Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Langevin 2007, 2006; Wong and Shen 2002) .
Even more directly connected to our work is a series of recent empirical analyses of the origins and spread of new state policies for higher education (Doyle 2006; Doyle et al. 2005; McLendon et al. 2005; McLendon et al. 2007; Weinstein and Krause 2006) . In several event history analyses, McLendon and colleagues studied the factors driving states to adopt new accountability regimes and reforms in public-sector governance of higher education (McLendon et al. 2006; McLendon et al. 2007 ). Doyle (2006) , also using EHA, examined the origins and spread of broad-based, merit scholarship programs in the 1990s. This emerging line of research presents a mixed picture. One important finding is that state political and governance arrangements contribute far more than previously thought in shaping policy change for higher education. The evidence for interstate diffusion pressures, however, remains unclear: while some studies have documented distinctive diffusionlike forces at work in the adoption of certain state financing innovations, studies of other policies, namely accountability mandates, have found no such effect.
Drawing on these literatures, we distilled the following 10 hypotheses, which guided our investigation into dual enrollment policy making:
H1:
States with the fastest rates of growth in the number of high school graduates will be more likely to adopt a dual enrollment policy.
One of the most prominent public rationales stated in support of dual enrollment programs in many states involves the need for increased college readiness against the backdrop of marked demographic growth (Hunt and Carroll 2006; Palmer 2000) . Because many states claim to have pursued dual enrollment policies as a strategy for addressing this twofold challenge, we hypothesize that states with the greatest percentage gains in high school graduates will be the ones most likely to adopt these programs.
H2:
States with a higher percentage of total higher education enrollments in the two-year sector will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
Two-year colleges have been among the most vocal proponents of dual enrollment programs, viewing the programs as a means by which to increase enrollments and attain new sources of revenue (Crooks 1998; Morest and Karp 2006) . Because systematic, across-state and across-time data on the lobbying strength of the two-year college sector does not exist, we turn to twoyear enrollments as a proxy measure of the sector's influence among state elected officials: states whose two-year sectors are larger, relative to the fouryear sectors, will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies because of the greater influence within those states of two-year institutions and their constituencies.
H3:
States with relatively low levels of college aptitude among high school seniors will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
The academic performance of students within a state may influence the adoption of dual enrollment policies. Because dual enrollment may be seen as a way to improve the college readiness of underprepared students (e.g., Hoffman 2005), the lower a state's mean college aptitude among high school seniors, we hypothesize, the more likely a state is to pursue dual enrollment as a policy remedy.
H4:
States with P-16 councils will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies than states without these structures. P-16 councils, which exist in some 30 states, are charged with facilitating communication and collaboration between the K-12 education and the higher education sectors (Boswell 2000; Haycock 2002 ). Since dual enrollment requires a joint effort between high schools and colleges, P-16 councils may be instrumental in raising awareness among policy makers of the potential value in this type of policy initiative. Where P-16 councils exist, states will be more likely to adopt a dual enrollment strategy, we believe.
H5:
States with consolidated governing boards will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
Consolidated governing boards are one structural mechanism for the statewide governance of higher education. They represent the most centralized form of state oversight, vesting power over academic programs, budgeting, and policy mandates in the hands of a central state board. Several recent studies have found consolidated governing boards associated with various state policy innovations in the area of higher education (e.g., Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn et al. 1996) . Because these boards possess greater analytic resources with which to plan for higher education within a state and because these arrangements may more readily facilitate communication across multiple educational sectors and systems within a state, we reason that states that pursue the consolidated-board approach to statewide governance of higher education will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment programs.
H6:
States with unified Republican control of the legislature will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
When a political party gains unified control over the legislature, legislators face fewer impediments to enacting legislation (Squire and Hamm 2005) . With respect to the policy preferences of the two major parties, some evidence exists in both the K-12 education and the higher education arenas suggesting that Republicans may tend to favor policies promoting choice as a means of promoting greater efficiency through the educational market (e.g., Lyall and Sell 2005; McLendon et al. 2005; Wong and Langevin 2006) . Dual enrollment is similar to educational choice in that it allows students to attend alternate educational institutions if they perceive that they are not receiving the preparation they need for college from their local high schools. Where Republicans have overcome the institutional inertia of divided legislative control, we reason, their policy preferences will likely enhance the prospect of a state enacting a dual enrollment policy.
H7:
States whose governors hold more institutional power will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
Governors in many states have been among the leading proponents of dual enrollment (Boswell 2000; Conklin 2005) . We posit that, because a governor's ability to advocate successfully for the adoption of a dual enrollment program likely depends in part on the governor's formal powers of office, states that endow their governors with stronger institutional powers will be the most likely to adopt these policies.
H8:
States that previously passed K-12 school voucher legislation will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
Hypotheses 8 and 9 draw on select studies from the policy innovation and diffusion literature, which have found that some states seem to have a preternatural propensity toward innovating in certain policy areas (Berry and Berry 1999; Mintrom 1997; Walker 1969; Wong and Shen 2002) . In the policy arena for education, we are particularly interested in whether states with other innovative education policies designed to promote choice and competition are associated with the adoption of dual enrollment policies. These characteristics are important because dual enrollment provides parents with a choice of advanced learning opportunities for their children and also creates competition between K-12 schools (especially among Advanced Placement [AP] and International Baccalaureate [IB] programs) and postsecondary institutions for top high school students. One similar innovative reform effort is voucher legislation, which provides parents with public subsidies to enroll their children in the public or private school of their choice. Interest in vouchers was motivated by concerns about failing public schools as a way to create improvement in the education system through competition (Chubb and Moe 1990) . Thus, we posit that states that have previously adopted K-12 school voucher legislation may be predisposed toward innovating in the P-16 arena and thus more likely to adopt a dual enrollment program.
H9:
States that have previously adopted a broad-based, merit scholarship program will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies.
As with the previous hypothesis, we reason that states that have previously adopted innovative postsecondary policies, such as a broad-based merit scholarship program, may be more likely to innovate in the area of dual enrollment. State-based merit scholarship programs provide high school graduates meeting certain academic criteria with financial awards to cover all or part of the tuition American Journal of Education and fees required to attend in-state institutions. While states have traditionally only provided subsidies to offset the costs of in-state public tuition, the advent of state merit scholarship programs essentially requires public institutions to compete with private colleges and universities for state dollars.
H10:
States will be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies if their neighbors have already adopted the policy.
As noted, policy diffusion refers to the tendency of states to emulate the policy behavior of their neighbors. States may engage in policy mimicry for a variety of reasons. In the context of dual enrollment policies, we believe that states might copy one another because of normative pressures-that is, dual enrollment may appear to policy makers as a cutting-edge idea whose time has come (Kingdon 1994 )-and as a decision shortcut-that is, a strategy for reducing the complexities of public decision making under conditions of scarce time and resources. Finally, we included economic and demographic control characteristics as commonly included in other studies of state policy innovation. The total population (logged) and per capita income (logged) for each state were included to control for any correlations between the predictor variables and a state's size or wealth.
Research Design
This study was conducted using event history analysis to examine factors that influence the timing of state adoption of a dual enrollment policy. This analytic technique originated in the biomedical sciences but has been incorporated into the social sciences (particularly political science) to understand the occurrence of dynamic social phenomena (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney and Lee 1995) . Event history analysis provides an advantage over traditional logistic regression models by allowing for the analysis of time-dependent variables, taking explicitly into account the length of time until the event occurs and providing an estimate of the risk of an event occurring at any given time period (Bennett 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004) .
Before Berry and Berry's path-breaking work in the early 1990s, analysts traditionally used cross-sectional models for examining the policy behavior of state governments. The limitation of such an approach, of course, is that such behavior typically is dynamic and possessing of a time property. Berry and Berry's solution, event history analysis, brought to the study of policy adoption a technique ideally suited for understanding how time-varying characteristics of states influence the likelihood of a particular state enacting a particular policy at a given moment in time.
In the years since the Berry's initial work, event history analysis has undergone refinement and improved sophistication. One important development, for example, involves the way these models have attempted to remedy the problem of duration dependence, which occurs when the risk of experiencing the event varies in different time periods. Some of the earliest discretetime logit models, for example, failed to adequately control for time dependency, resulting in potentially spurious relationships. Later models incorporated various specifications of time, including the use of time-trend variables, annual dummy variables, and various spline techniques. Most recently, much of the field has moved toward greater acceptance of continuous-time event history models, such as the Cox proportional hazards model, which holds a number of advantages over prior approaches in its modeling of temporal dependency (Beck et al. 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Mooney 2001) .
Variables and Measures
Our analysis exploited a longitudinal panel data set from 1976 to 2005 in the American states, excluding Nebraska, Alaska, and Hawaii. These three states are commonly excluded from comparative state policy studies because the characteristics of these states preclude the examination of important conceptual considerations (Doyle 2006; McLendon et al. 2006; Mintrom 1997) . In Nebraska, the effects of partisan control of the legislature cannot be analyzed due to the state's unicameral legislative system. In Alaska and Hawaii, regional diffusion cannot be tested since these two states are quite distant spatially from all other states. 4 A description of each of the variables used in the analysis and the sources of data can be found in table 1.
The dependent variable for our study is expressed in terms of a hazard rate, which is a latent variable of the underlying risk process for the adoption of dual enrollment policies. The data used to estimate the hazard rate is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state legislature enacted a dual enrollment policy in a particular year. Dual enrollment was defined using the U.S. Department of Education's definition as "programs [that] allow high school students to simultaneously earn credit toward a high school diploma and a postsecondary degree or certificate" (2006) . 5 Although many state dual enrollment policies have been modified over time to address program features such as funding and admissions requirements, our analysis focused on the initial adoption of any policy relating to dual enrollment within a state. Despite some notable differences in policy features across states, all of the programs in our analysis are similar in that they provide high school students with the right to enroll in postsecondary courses while receiving credit at both the postsecondary institution and the high school. By 2005, a total of 40 states ; 2006) . The commission received a list of statutes from the National Conference of State Legislatures, compiled additional information from state Web sites, and confirmed a summary of the dual enrollment policies for each state with a representative from the state higher education executive office. Their policy audit provides a list of citations for all of the dual enrollment statues in each state, along with a short summary of the key characteristics of these state-level policies. For this analysis, these citations from the WICHE audit were referenced in the online databases of LexisNexis and FindLaw, as well as individual state government Web sites, to identify the year of enactment for the first dual enrollment policy in each state. In addition, a keyword search on dual and concurrent enrollment was conducted on these Web sites to identify any additional statutes that may have been overlooked. In cases where the initial year of policy adoption was unclear, the date was confirmed by referencing the state session laws from various years at the university's law library archives.
We compiled a longitudinal, state-level database for this analysis. The data for the independent variables were collected from a variety of reliable secondary sources, as described below. A summary of the descriptive statistics for each of these variables in 1976 and 2005 is provided in table 2.
Percent change of high school graduates is an annual measure indicating the percent change in the number of high school graduates in the state from the previous year. 6 State-level data on high school graduation rates from the National Center for Education Statistics were available in electronic format at the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) data library Web site.
7
Percent of enrollments in two-year institutions is an annual measure calculated as the number of enrollments in two-year institutions divided by the total number of enrollments in all institutions of higher education within each state. Data were downloaded from the SREB data library.
College aptitude of high school seniors indicates the differences between the state's mean SAT or ACT performance of graduating seniors and the national average. Comparing a state's average scores on these tests relative to the national average provides a benchmark to gauge the relative college aptitude of each state. A time-varying independent variable was calculated as the percent difference in a state's average SAT or ACT scores from the national average on the corresponding test.
8 Scores from SAT tests were used if 50 percent or more of the state's high school graduates took the SAT; otherwise, ACT scores were used. Data were retrieved from various issues of the National Center for Education Statistic's Digest of Education Statistics and from the ACT. 9 P-16 organizational structure is a time-varying, dichotomous variable for whether the state has a K-16, P-16, or P-20 council, regardless of whether the council was created by legislation, executive order, or a voluntary agency. The purpose of these organizations is to engage in collaborate efforts to "to create a system of education which begins in early childhood and ends after college that promotes access, standards, accountability and life-long learning. Other common goals include smoothing the transition from high school to college, improving teaching quality, reducing remediation and raising student achievement across all educational levels" (Education Commission of the States 2006, 1). Participants in these organizations may include the governor, members of the legislature, college and university representatives, school board members, officials from the state department of education or other state agencies, representatives of local school districts, and community or business groups. The data for this variable was taken from a 2006 report on P-16 collaboration from the Education Commission of the States, which is available online.
10
Consolidated governing board indicates whether the state had this type of statewide higher education governance arrangement, according to McGuinness's (1985 McGuinness's ( , 1988 McGuinness's ( , 1994 McGuinness's ( , 1997 McGuinness's ( , 2003 ) fivefold typology of governance (i.e., planning agency, advisory coordinating board, regulatory coordinating board without budget authority, regulatory coordinating board with budget authority, and consolidated governing board). We used a dummy variable indicating the presence of a consolidated governing board.
Unified Republican control of the legislature is a time-varying dichotomous variable with a value of one if Republicans held the majority of seats in both the House and Senate. Data up to 2004 were taken from Klarner's "Measurement of Partisan Balance of State Government," which is available online from State Politics and Policy Quarterly).
11 Data for 2005 are taken from the National Conference of State Legislatures.
12
Gubernatorial power is a time-varying index based on formal powers of tenure, veto, budget, appointment, party control, and organization. The values of the index range from one to five, with higher values indicating greater institutional power of the governor. The data are publicly available online.
13
Two time-varying dichotomous variables were used to indicate the presence of innovative education reform policies within each state. The first variable had a value of one if the state had adopted voucher legislation, which provides publicly funded voucher payments, tax credits, or tax deductions for parents to use for a child's educational expenses. Data on the year of adoption for voucher legislation came from the Education Commission of the States Web site.
14 The second variable had a value of one if the state had adopted a broad-based merit aid program for higher education, such as the Georgia HOPE scholarship program. States were identified as having a broad-based merit aid program if they met the three criteria identified by Cornwell et al. (2006) : (1) anyone eligible for the award is guaranteed to receive it, (2) there is no cap on the number of students who receive the award, and (3) aid is available over a number of years. Finally, diffusion of dual enrollment policies was measured as the number of neighboring states that have adopted a dual enrollment policy. States are considered "neighbors" if they share a physical border, as defined by Berry and Berry (1990) . This time-varying variable was calculated based on the adoption dates for the dependent variable among the neighbors surrounding each state.
Methodology
In this study, event history analysis is used to examine factors that influence the timing of state adoption of a dual enrollment policy. The analysis begins in 1976, the year in which California adopted the first state-level dual enrollment policy, and ends in 2005. Time is measured in discrete units as the number of years since 1976 (t) until a state (i) adopts a dual enrollment policy. States that had not adopted a dual enrollment period by 2005 are classified as right-censored observations. Event history analysis is able to use information from both censored and noncensored cases to predict the risk of event occurrence at a point in time.
Two important distributional functions within event history analysis are the survival function and the hazard function. The survival function is the probability a unit will survive (or fail to experience the event of interest) longer than time t (Singer and Willett 2003) . In this analysis, the survival function represents the probability that a state does not adopt a dual enrollment policy in a given year. The hazard function estimates the instantaneous rate of change in the probability of experiencing an event at time t, conditional upon survival up to the specified time period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). This can be interpreted as an indicator of how the risk of adopting a dual enrollment policy changes over time for states that have not yet adopted a policy. The multivariate model assesses how specific explanatory variables affect the hazard rate.
The particular specification used for this analysis is the Cox proportional hazards model. Since the probability that a state adopts a dual enrollment policy may change over time as these policies become more popular, the risk of experiencing the event must be allowed to vary in different time periods. American Journal of Education
The Cox model can account for these changes over time without specifying the functional form of the duration dependence, allowing the researcher to focus on the relationship between the outcome and the covariates of theoretical interest (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999) . Any state that has not yet adopted a dual enrollment policy in a given year is included in the "risk set" of observations that are eligible to have an event in that year. The Cox model uses information about the order of the events to estimate the conditional probability that a state will adopt a dual enrollment policy for each time period, given the number of states at risk and the values of those states on important covariates. Maximum partial likelihood estimation is used to calculate the parameter estimates by using information about these ordered failure times to predict the likelihood of observing the outcomes that have occurred. This method provides an estimate of how the hazard function changes as a function of the covariates, without making any assumptions about the underlying nature or shape of the baseline hazard rate.
If more than one state adopts a dual enrollment policy in the same year, a so-called tied event has occurred. Since maximum partial likelihood estimation uses information about the rank ordering of event times, tied events make it difficult to determine which states should be included in the risk set because the sequence of these events is undetermined. In the case of tied events, the exact discrete method was used to construct the partial likelihood estimates. This method estimates a conditional logit model by calculating the probability of the event occurrences in the period using all possible combinations of events and nonevents.
The model estimated for the adoption of a dual enrollment policy is
where is the proportional hazard of adopting a dual enrollment policy h (t) i for state i in year t, and is the matrix of regression parameters and covariates b x for the variables used to test the hypotheses posed (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The coefficients are exponentiated so that they are expressed in the form of hazard ratios, which makes it easier to interpret them substantively. Hazard ratios greater than one indicate that the risk of adopting a dual enrollment policy increases at higher values of the covariate, thus indicating that a state is more likely to adopt a dual enrollment policy. The interpretation for a hazard ratio of less than one is that the risk of adopting a dual enrollment policy decreases as the values of the covariate increase, indicating a longer time to event.
One of the assumptions of the Cox proportional hazards model is that the ratio between the hazard functions of any two observations or groups is constant over time. This proportional hazards assumption was tested by calculating Schoenfeld residuals to determine whether the effect of any of the covariates changed disproportionately over time (Grambsch and Therneau 1994) . The results indicate that there is no evidence of nonproportional hazards among that the model as a whole, or any of the individual variables. Other diagnostic methods included an assessment of the overall model fit using Cox-Snell residuals and an examination of the deviance residuals to identify any influential observations.
Findings
Descriptive information providing the number of states in the risk set at each time period, the survivor function, and the hazard rate provide useful perspective on the pattern of state adoption of dual enrollment policies (see table 3 ). The spread of dual enrollment policies has occurred relatively slowly over a time span of nearly 30 years, with no more than four states adopting a new policy in any given year. As indicated by the final survivor function, only 17 percent of the states in the sample had not adopted a dual enrollment policy by the end of 2005. Next, the hazard rate provides an estimate of the instantaneous rate of change in the probability of adopting a dual enrollment policy in a specific year for states that have not yet adopted a policy. For all years prior to 2005, the hazard rates is less than 4 percent, indicating that there is no single time point in which there was a sudden change in the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment policy. In 2005 the hazard rate increased sharply, as four of the remaining 12 states in the risk set (Indiana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee) each adopted a new policy. Figure 2 provides a graph of the smoothed hazard rate, which illustrates changes in the estimated hazard rate over time. 15 It appears that the hazard rate peaks around the late 1990s and then begins to decline slightly during the remaining years. This decline results from the process of censoring, rather than the event process itself. Over time, as more states adopt dual enrollment policies, the number of states still available to adopt a policy declines, so the likelihood of a state adopting a new policy in any given year also declines.
The results from our multivariate event history analysis are provided in table 4. The analysis identifies numerous influences on state adoption of dual enrollment policies, with significant effects in the hypothesized direction for half of the variables tested. These findings are consistent across numerous specifications of the model and among the zero-order estimates between the dependent variable and each independent variable before controlling for any other characteristics. 16 All results reported in the text are from the full model and significant at the 95 percent level unless otherwise noted.
First, the results indicate that states with a large percentage of higher education enrollments in two-year institutions are more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies than states with small two-year sectors. Although the 95 percent confidence interval includes zero, this finding is significant within a 90 percent confidence interval, and the effect is in the hypothesized direction. As noted previously, this finding is consistent with qualitative studies that have identified community colleges as key proponents of dual enrollment programs (Crooks 1998; Morest and Karp 2006) . Dual enrollment may be particularly beneficial for community colleges because it allows them to recruit a broader range of students who have demonstrated the ability to succeed in their institution. Conversely, four-year institutions tend to be more concerned about Second, we find that states with consolidated governing boards are more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies. These boards may play an important role in facilitating the cooperation and coordination across institutions that is needed to develop a statewide system of dual enrollment. The hazard of adopting a dual enrollment policy is 3.86 times greater for states with consolidated governing boards relative to states with more decentralized organizational structures, on average. Interestingly, the presence of a P-16 organizational structure has no effect on the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment policy. One possible explanation for this nonsignificant finding is that many states already had dual enrollment policies in place before the existence of P-16 structures. The first P-16 organizational structure was established in Florida in 1994, and 22 states had adopted dual enrollment policies by this time.
Next, the hazard of adopting a dual enrollment policy tends to be greater for states with unified Republican control of the legislature. On average, the hazard of adopting a dual enrollment policy is 3.0 times greater for states with unified Republican control of the legislature relative to states with divided partisan control or Democratic control. This finding may support other research suggesting that Republicans tend to favor policies for choice in education as a means of promoting greater efficiency through the educational market (Moe 2001; Renzulli and Roscigno 2005) . The smoothed hazard function in figure 3 illustrates the relative magnitude of the effect of each of these state political and structural characteristics on the probability of adopting a dual enrollment policy. The solid line illustrates how the hazard function changes over time for an "average" state, which represents an observation with average values for all of the independent variables in the analysis. The patterned lines indicate how the estimated hazard rate changes given hypothetical values of each of the covariates of interest. It is important to note that the difference in the hazard rate appears to be proportional between groups with these different characteristics over time, supporting the assumption of the Cox proportional hazards model. From the graph we can also see that the effects for states with unified Republican control of the legislature or consolidated governing boards are relatively similar in magnitude. There is a smaller effect on the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment policy among states in the top quartile of enrollments in two-year institutions.
Finally, our model indicates that states that have previously adopted other innovative educational reforms, such as voucher legislation or broad-based merit aid programs, are more likely to adopt a dual enrollment policy. On average, the hazard of adopting a dual enrollment policy is 3.85 times greater for states with voucher legislation and 8.23 times greater for states with broadbased merit aid programs, relative to states without either of these innovative educational reforms. These results correspond with other research indicating that some states tend to be leaders in certain policy areas, likely due to their formal and informal information networks (Grupp and Richards 1975) , while smaller and less advanced states will model their policies after leaders in the field through "positioning behavior" (Collier and Messick 1975) . Surprisingly, there was no evidence to support the regional diffusion hypothesis that states are more likely to adopt a dual enrollment policy if neighboring states have similar policies in place. This indicates that policy makers may be turning more toward states that appear to be national leaders in the education arena for policy ideas, rather than to regional influences. Figure 4 illustrates the relative magnitude of the effect of each of the innovative educational reforms on the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment policy by comparing the hazard rate for an "average state" to states with voucher policies and broad-based merit aid programs. The effect is greatest for states with merit aid programs, although both reforms substantially increase the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment policy. Moreover, the presence of these innovative reform policies has a much larger effect on the likelihood of adopting a dual enrollment program than any of the political or organizational characteristics in figure 3 .
Conclusions
This study, as one of the first empirical tests of the antecedents of P-16 policy, provides a number of valuable perspectives on the sources of influence in state adoption of dual enrollment policies. Using a longitudinal data set spanning nearly 30 years, we find that state political characteristics, organizational structures, and policy conditions stand as important factors in understanding the rise of dual enrollment policies in the American states. These findings are all in the hypothesized directions and generally consistent with other recent studies of policy adoption in the K-12 and the higher education literatures.
Among the political characteristics of states, the presence of a large twoyear sector of higher education and unified Republican control are both associated with an increase in the likelihood of a state adopting a dual enrollment policy. Dual enrollment tends to have a particularly beneficial effect on the enrollment and revenues of two-year colleges, thus it is little surprise that these institutions might encourage state policy makers to pass legislation advantaging their constituency. Precisely how they go about mobilizing or exerting such influence, however, is unclear. Interest-group activity in higher education remains too little investigated and poorly understood. In the context of dualenrollment policy making, what incentives, information networks, and mobilization patterns attend the emergence of organized political activity advocating the adoption of these policies? Although these questions clearly lie beyond the reach of our data, they point to prospectively valuable lines of future research, ones that could shed important insights into a broader range of interest-group activity at the intersection of the higher education and the K-12 arenas.
Our analysis also suggests that states whose legislatures are more solidly Republican tend to be more likely to adopt dual enrollment programs. This finding aligns well with the conclusions reached by other recent empirical studies of policy adoption in the education arena, namely, that partisan control of state political institutions can hold distinctive implications for the policyadoption behaviors of states (Archibald and Feldman 2006; McLendon et al. 2006; Langevin 2006, 2007) . Although a number of potential explanations for these partisanship effects may exist, 17 we believe that the relationships that we have documented may owe to the choice and efficiency considerations that (rhetorically at least) are closely entwined with contemporary debate over dual enrollment programs, thus making the policies particularly appealing to Republicans.
Turning to organizational structures, we find that states with consolidated governing boards are more likely than states with less centrally powerful forms of postsecondary governance to adopt a dual enrollment policy. The highly centralized nature of policy formulation carried out by these consolidated governing boards may provide the requisite analytic support needed for policy innovation and may lower barriers to across-campus communication and coordination. A growing body of literature has noted the effects of postsecondary governance arrangements on a variety of policy outcomes in higher education, including tuition and appropriations levels, indicators of quality and cost in public higher education, utilization of the private-college sector, and state adoption of new financing and accountability policies (e.g., Doyle 2006; Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn et al. 1996; Knott and Payne 2003; McLendon et al. 2005; McLendon et al. 2006; Volkwein 1987; Zumeta 1996) . Aside from our study, however, few previous empirical investigations have documented the impact of these governance arrangements on policies linking the K-12 and higher educations sectors (Kirst 2005) . Future research on P-16 policy would do well to incorporate data on the governance structures of both the higher education and the K-12 systems of states, examining the joint effects of authority and regulatory structures on patterns of policy adoption.
Finally, we find a large statistical effect associated with certain policy conditions of states, as states with voucher policies and broad-based merit aid programs are five to seven times more likely to adopt a dual enrollment program than states without these types of policies, on average. It would appear that some states may be predisposed toward policy tinkering in the education arena. When such a state adopts one innovative policy, it may "soften the system" (Berry and Berry 1999) for subsequent experimentation. But why do some states seem more receptive than others to policy innovation and change? To what extent is the phenomenon cultural and thus deeply embedded in the shared understandings, values, attitudes, and beliefs of a particular state's populace (Elazar 1984) ? Alternatively, to what extent does this pattern of policy choice owe to factors more idiosyncratic in nature, such as intersections of demographic conditions, economic forces, and political leadership? Future research may also examine whether states with certain characteristics may be more likely to consider all P-16 initiatives, or if different characteristics lead states to favor different options for improving the transition from secondary to postsecondary education. For example, different types of P-16 policies may reflect a state's policy preferences toward the often conflicting goals of rewarding merit versus promoting broad access. Continued efforts on this research agenda will improve our understanding of the various pressures faced by states as they seek to improve the transition from high school to college by uniting secondary and postsecondary education. Notes 1. Although colleges of education, teachers associations, and state governments have worked together closely around issues of reforming teacher preparation, policy development involving finance, governance, accountability, and curriculum typically has occurred within separate and distinct spheres, one for the K-12 domain and the other for higher education.
2. California's dual enrollment policy was enacted in 1976 as a statute in the California Education Code on the attendance and admission of "special" full-time and part-time students at community colleges (California Education Code 1976) . The statute provided authority to the governing board of local school districts to identify qualified high school students to participate in academic and vocational courses at community colleges in an effort to "ensure a smoother transition from high school to college for pupils by providing them with greater exposure to the collegiate atmosphere" (chap. 1010, § 2). The legislation also required both school districts and community colleges to provide credit for any dual enrollment courses completed by high school students.
3. Notably, Walker defined policy innovation as a policy that is new to the state adopting it. This, too, is our approach.
4. We also tried coding the regional diffusion variable as zero for Alaska and Hawaii (as they have no contiguous neighbors) and including these two states in the analysis. The results were essentially unchanged. We present the 47-state analysis in this study as commonly accepted in the literature on state policy innovation and diffusion.
5. These programs differ from AP and IB programs in that they are "actual college courses-rather than college-like or college-level" (U.S. Department of Education 2006, 1). In addition, they are more likely to be widespread policies that are regulated by the state (Karp et al. 2004 ). There are some states without dual enrollment legislation that may have dual enrollment agreements between specific universities and high schools, but these agreements lack state oversight or regulation and have not been considered in this analysis. 15. This smoothed curve is based on a weighted average of the hazard rates over time, so that no single time period distorts the representation of the underlying trend. The Epanechnikov kernel function (with Stata's default setting for automatic bandwith selection) is used for weighting, which is an iterative process that gives more weight to hazard estimates closer to each discrete time point.
16. The control variable for total population logged is significant at the 10 percent level in the final model only. When other state characteristics are held constant, states with large populations tend to be more likely to adopt dual enrollment policies than smaller states.
17. Barrilleaux et al. (2002) identify several factors that can mediate the effects of partisanship on state policy outcomes, including whether the party pursues policy commitments consistent with its true preferences or adjusts its positions strategically in order to attract voters.
